| The copeland method: I.: Relationships and the dictionary DG Saari, VR Merlin Economic theory 8, 51-76, 1996 | 159 | 1996 |
| A geometric examination of Kemeny's rule DG Saari, VR Merlin Social Choice and Welfare 17 (3), 403-438, 2000 | 129 | 2000 |
| The probability of conflicts in a US presidential type election MR Feix, D Lepelley, VR Merlin, JL Rouet Economic Theory 23, 227-257 (2004), 2004 | 68 | 2004 |
| Copeland method II: Manipulation, monotonicity, and paradoxes VR Merlin, DG Saari Journal of Economic Theory 72 (1), 148-172, 1997 | 65 | 1997 |
| On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules M Tataru, V Merlin Mathematical Social Sciences 34 (1), 81-90, 1997 | 57 | 1997 |
| Scoring run-off paradoxes for variable electorates D Lepelley, V Merlin Economic Theory 17, 53-80, 2001 | 56 | 2001 |
| On the probability that all decision rules select the same winner V Merlin, M Tataru, F Valognes Journal of Mathematical Economics 33 (2), 183-207, 2000 | 55 | 2000 |
| The axiomatic characterizations of majority voting and scoring rules V Merlin Mathématiques et sciences humaines. Mathematics and social sciences, 2003 | 44 | 2003 |
| On the voting power of an alliance and the subsequent power of its members MR Feix, D Lepelley, VR Merlin, JL Rouet Social Choice and Welfare 28 (2), 181-207, 2007 | 35 | 2007 |
| On the likelihood of Condorcet's profiles V Merlin, M Tataru, F Valognes Social Choice and Welfare 19 (1), 193-206, 2002 | 30 | 2002 |
| Majority efficient representation of the citizens in a federal union M Feix, D Lepelley, V Merlin, JL Rouet, L Vidu Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models: Essays by and in Honor of …, 2021 | 29 | 2021 |
| Gerrymander-proof representative democracies S Bervoets, V Merlin International Journal of Game Theory 41, 473-488, 2012 | 27 | 2012 |
| The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes V Merlin, F Valognes Mathematical Social Sciences 48 (3), 343-361, 2004 | 26 | 2004 |
| A characterization of the maximin rule in the context of voting R Congar, V Merlin Theory and Decision 72, 131-147, 2012 | 25 | 2012 |
| On the Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and extended scoring rules for three alternatives M Diss, V Merlin, F Valognes Handbook on approval voting, 255-283, 2010 | 25 | 2010 |
| Choix social positionnel et principe majoritaire D Lepelley, V Merlin Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, 29-48, 1998 | 22 | 1998 |
| Cooperation Among Local Governments to Deliver Public Services: A'Structural'Bivariate Response Model with Fixed Effects and Endogenous Covariate E Di Porto, VR Merlin, S Paty GATE Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon-‐St Étienne Working …, 2013 | 21 | 2013 |
| An example of probability computations under the IAC assumption: The stability of scoring rules M Diss, A Louichi, V Merlin, H Smaoui Mathematical Social Sciences 64 (1), 57-66, 2012 | 19 | 2012 |
| Three ways to compute accurately the probability of the referendum paradox D Lepelley, V Merlin, JL Rouet Mathematical Social Sciences 62 (1), 28-33, 2011 | 19 | 2011 |
| Evaluating voting systems with probability models M Diss, V Merlin Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer International Publishing, 2021 | 15 | 2021 |
