Follow
Thomas Wiseman
Thomas Wiseman
Verified email at austin.utexas.edu
Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
Observational learning and demand for search goods
K Hendricks, A Sorensen, T Wiseman
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 4 (1), 1-31, 2012
962012
Capacity choice counters the Coase conjecture
RP McAfee, T Wiseman
The Review of Economic Studies 75 (1), 317-331, 2008
822008
A partial folk theorem for games with unknown payoff distributions
T Wiseman
Econometrica 73 (2), 629-645, 2005
592005
Group insurance and lending with endogenous social collateral
B Paal, T Wiseman
Journal of Development Economics 94 (1), 30-40, 2011
552011
Reputation and impermanent types
T Wiseman
Games and Economic Behavior 62 (1), 190-210, 2008
472008
When does predation dominate collusion?
T Wiseman
Econometrica 85 (2), 555-584, 2017
372017
A partial folk theorem for games with private learning
T Wiseman
Theoretical Economics 7 (2), 217-239, 2012
362012
War and stability in dynamic international systems
C Krainin, T Wiseman
The Journal of Politics 78 (4), 1139-1152, 2016
272016
The impact of gun laws: A model of crime and self-defense
HM Mialon, T Wiseman
Economics Letters 88 (2), 170-175, 2005
262005
The impact of gun laws: A model of crime and self-defense
HM Mialon, T Wiseman
Economics Letters 88 (2), 170-175, 2005
262005
Last-minute bidding in sequential auctions with unobserved, stochastic entry
K Hendricks, I Onur, T Wiseman
Review of Industrial Organization 40, 1-19, 2012
252012
Last-minute bidding in sequential auctions with unobserved, stochastic entry
K Hendricks, I Onur, T Wiseman
Review of Industrial Organization 40, 1-19, 2012
252012
Reputation and exogenous private learning
T Wiseman
Journal of Economic Theory 144 (3), 1352-1357, 2009
222009
Wage strikes in 1880s America: A test of the war of attrition model
TM Geraghty, T Wiseman
Explorations in Economic History 45 (4), 303-326, 2008
222008
Cooperation, secret handshakes, and imitation in the prisoners' dilemma
T Wiseman, O Yilankaya
Games and Economic Behavior 37 (1), 216-242, 2001
212001
A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes
M Pęski, T Wiseman
Theoretical Economics 10 (1), 131-173, 2015
192015
A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes
M Pęski, T Wiseman
Theoretical Economics 10 (1), 131-173, 2015
192015
School choice with neighbors
UM Dur, T Wiseman
Journal of Mathematical Economics 83, 101-109, 2019
182019
A simple model of optimal hate crime legislation
L Gan, RC WILLIAMS III, T Wiseman
Economic Inquiry 49 (3), 674-684, 2011
182011
A simple model of optimal hate crime legislation
L Gan, RC WILLIAMS III, T Wiseman
Economic Inquiry 49 (3), 674-684, 2011
182011
The system can't perform the operation now. Try again later.
Articles 1–20