Krishnamurthy Iyer
Krishnamurthy Iyer
Industrial and Systems Engineering, University of Minnesota
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Cited by
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Mean field equilibria of dynamic auctions with learning
K Iyer, R Johari, M Sundararajan
Management Science 60 (12), 2949-2970, 2014
Optimal signaling mechanisms in unobservable queues
D Lingenbrink, K Iyer
Operations Research, 2019
Information aggregation and allocative efficiency in smooth markets
K Iyer, R Johari, CC Moallemi
Management Science 60 (10), 2509-2524, 2014
Mean field equilibria for resource competition in spatial settings
P Yang, K Iyer, P Frazier
Stochastic Systems 8 (4), 307-334, 2018
From monetary to nonmonetary mechanism design via artificial currencies
A Gorokh, S Banerjee, K Iyer
Mathematics of Operations Research 46 (3), 835-1234, C2, 2021
Signaling in online retail: Efficacy of public signals
D Lingenbrink, K Iyer
Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and …, 2018
Information design for congested social services: Optimal need-based persuasion
J Anunrojwong, K Iyer, V Manshadi
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'20), 2021
Near-efficient allocation using artificial currency in repeated settings
A Gorokh, S Banerjee, K Iyer
Web and Internet Economics (WINE 2016), 2016
When fixed price meets priority auctions: Competing firms with different pricing and service rules
J Gao, K Iyer, H Topaloglu
Stochastic Systems 9 (1), 47–80, 2019
Persuading risk-conscious agents: A geometric approach
J Anunrojwong, K Iyer, D Lingenbrink
Web and Internet Economics (WINE 2019), 2020
Welfare analysis of dark pools
K Iyer, R Johari, C Moallemi
Learning to Persuade on the Fly: Robustness Against Ignorance
Y Zu, K Iyer, H Xu
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'21), 2021
Information design in spatial resource competition
P Yang, K Iyer, P Frazier
Web and Internet Economics (WINE 2019), 2019
Price competition under linear demand and finite inventories: Contraction and approximate equilibria
J Gao, K Iyer, H Topaloglu
Operations Research Letters 45 (4), 382-387, 2017
Sensitivity analysis and optimal ultimately stationary deterministic policies in some constrained discounted cost models
K Iyer, N Hemachandra
Mathematical Methods of Operations Research 71 (3), 401-425, 2010
The Remarkable Robustness of the Repeated Fisher Market
A Gorokh, S Banerjee, K Iyer
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'21), 2021
Tractable equilibria in sponsored search with endogenous budgets
DF Ciocan, K Iyer
Operations research 69 (1), 227-244, 2021
When bribes are harmless: The power and limits of collusion-resilient mechanism design
A Gorokh, S Banerjee, K Iyer
Available at SSRN 3125003, 2019
Information and the value of execution guarantees
K Iyer, R Johari, CC Moallemi
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 673-673, 2012
Ultimately stationary deterministic strategies for stochastic games
KR Iyer, N Hemachandra
Proceedings of the international conference on advances in control and …, 2007
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