| The politics of precedent in international law: A social network application K Pelc American Political Science Review 108 (3), 547-564, 2014 | 169 | 2014 |
| What explains the low success rate of investor-state disputes? KJ Pelc International Organization 71 (3), 559-583, 2017 | 142 | 2017 |
| The politics of judicial economy at the World Trade Organization ML Busch, KJ Pelc International Organization 64 (2), 257-279, 2010 | 134 | 2010 |
| Seeking escape: The use of escape clauses in international trade agreements KJ Pelc International Studies Quarterly 53 (2), 349-368, 2009 | 132 | 2009 |
| Googling the WTO: What Search Engine Data Tell Us About the Political Economy of Institutions. K Pelc International Organization 67 (03), 629-655, 2013 | 88 | 2013 |
| Why do some countries get better WTO accession terms than others? KJ Pelc International Organization 65 (4), 639-672, 2011 | 79 | 2011 |
| Who gets to be in the room? Manipulating participation in WTO disputes L Johns, KJ Pelc International Organization 68 (3), 663-699, 2014 | 75 | 2014 |
| Cooperation in hard times: self-restraint of trade protection CL Davis, KJ Pelc Journal of Conflict Resolution 61 (2), 398-429, 2017 | 65 | 2017 |
| Measuring the cost of privacy: a look at the distributional effects of private bargaining J Kucik, KJ Pelc British Journal of Political Science 46 (4), 861-889, 2016 | 63 | 2016 |
| Do WTO disputes actually increase trade? S Chaudoin, J Kucik, K Pelc International Studies Quarterly 60 (2), 294-306, 2016 | 60 | 2016 |
| Constraining coercion? Legitimacy and its role in US trade policy, 1975–2000 KJ Pelc International Organization 64 (1), 65-96, 2010 | 59 | 2010 |
| When can multiple imputation improve regression estimates? V Arel-Bundock, KJ Pelc Political Analysis 26 (2), 240-245, 2018 | 57 | 2018 |
| Making and bending international rules: The design of exceptions and escape clauses in trade law KJ Pelc Cambridge University Press, 2016 | 55 | 2016 |
| Fear of crowds in world trade organization disputes: why don’t more countries participate? L Johns, KJ Pelc The Journal of Politics 78 (1), 88-104, 2016 | 47 | 2016 |
| Does the WTO need a Permanent Body of Panelists? ML Busch, KJ Pelc Journal of International Economic Law 12 (3), 579-594, 2009 | 40 | 2009 |
| How a retreat from global economic governance may empower business interests L Johns, KJ Pelc, RL Wellhausen The Journal of Politics 81 (2), 731-738, 2019 | 35 | 2019 |
| Who holds influence over WTO jurisprudence? M Daku, KJ Pelc Journal of International Economic Law 20 (2), 233-255, 2017 | 35 | 2017 |
| How states ration flexibility: Tariffs, remedies, and exchange rates as policy substitutes KJ Pelc World Politics 63 (4), 618-646, 2011 | 31 | 2011 |
| Free riding on enforcement in the world trade organization L Johns, KJ Pelc The Journal of Politics 80 (3), 873-889, 2018 | 28* | 2018 |
| When do international economic agreements allow countries to pay to breach? KJ Pelc, J Urpelainen The Review of International Organizations 10, 231-264, 2015 | 27 | 2015 |
Leslie JohnsUniversity of California, Los AngelesVerified email at polisci.ucla.edu
