Georgios Birmpas
Georgios Birmpas
Research Associate, University of Oxford
Verified email at aueb.gr - Homepage
TitleCited byYear
Comparing approximate relaxations of envy-freeness
G Amanatidis, G Birmpas, E Markakis
arXiv preprint arXiv:1806.03114, 2018
172018
Truthful allocation mechanisms without payments: Characterization and implications on fairness
G Amanatidis, G Birmpas, G Christodoulou, E Markakis
Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 545-562, 2017
172017
On truthful mechanisms for maximin share allocations
G Amanatidis, G Birmpas, E Markakis
arXiv preprint arXiv:1605.04026, 2016
172016
Coverage, matching, and beyond: new results on budgeted mechanism design
G Amanatidis, G Birmpas, E Markakis
International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, 414-428, 2016
92016
On budget-feasible mechanism design for symmetric submodular objectives
G Amanatidis, G Birmpas, E Markakis
International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, 1-15, 2017
32017
Tight welfare guarantees for pure nash equilibria of the uniform price auction
G Birmpas, E Markakis, O Telelis, A Tsikiridis
Theory of Computing Systems 63 (7), 1451-1469, 2019
22019
Cost-sharing models in participatory sensing
G Birmpas, C Courcoubetis, I Giotis, E Markakis
International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 43-56, 2015
22015
Peeking behind the ordinal curtain: improving distortion via cardinal queries
G Amanatidis, G Birmpas, A Filos-Ratsikas, AA Voudouris
arXiv preprint arXiv:1907.08165, 2019
12019
Cost Sharing over Combinatorial Domains: Complement-Free Cost Functions and Beyond
G Birmpas, E Markakis, G Schäfer
arXiv preprint arXiv:1910.06384, 2019
2019
Fairness and Efficiency in DAG-based Cryptocurrencies
G Birmpas, E Koutsoupias, P Lazos, FJ Marmolejo-Cossío
arXiv preprint arXiv:1910.02059, 2019
2019
Generalized Second-Price Auctions under Advertisement Settings
GD Birbas
2013
Χώρος Urysohn
ΓΔ Μπίρμπας, GD Birbas
2011
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Articles 1–12