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Bruno VERSAEVEL
Bruno VERSAEVEL
Associate Professor of Economics, EMLYON Business School & GATE
Verified email at em-lyon.com
Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
Patent Pools and Dynamic R&D Incentives
V Dequiedt, B Versaevel
International Review of Law and Economics 36, 59-69, 2013
542013
Investment timing and vertical relationships
E Billette de Villemeur, R Ruble, B Versaevel
International Journal of Industrial Organization 33, 110-123, 2014
362014
From private to public common agency
E Billette de Villemeur, B Versaevel
Journal of Economic Theory 111 (2), 305-309, 2003
172003
One lab, two firms, many possibilities: On R&D outsourcing in the biopharmaceutical industry
EB de Villemeur, B Versaevel
Journal of health economics 65, 260-283, 2019
142019
Pool patents to get COVID vaccines and drugs to all
E Billette de Villemeur, V Dequiedt, B Versaevel
Nature (correspondence), 529, 2021
13*2021
Market shares, R&D agreements, and the EU block exemption
R Ruble, B Versaevel
International Review of Law and Economics 37, 15-25, 2014
132014
Dynamic competition and intellectual property rights in a model of product development
EB de Villemeur, R Ruble, B Versaevel
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 100, 270-296, 2019
122019
Horizontal R&D cooperation and spillovers: evidence from France
D Vencatachellum, B Versaevel
Economics Bulletin 15 (19), 1-11, 2008
82008
Co-ordination costs and vertical integration in production franchise networks: a common agency model
B Versaevel
Research in Economics 56 (2), 157-186, 2002
72002
R&D Delegation in a Duopoly with Spillovers
B Versaevel, D Vencatachellum
The BE Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 9 (1), 2009
62009
Biopharmaceutical R&D outsourcing: Short-term gain for long-term pain?
E Billette de Villemeur, J Scannell, B Versaevel
Drug Discovery Today 27 (11), 1-9, 2022
3*2022
"Caveat preemptor": Coordination failure and success in a duopoly investment game
E Billette de Villemeur, R Ruble, B Versaevel
Economics Letters 118 (2), 250-254, 2013
32013
Alertness, Leadership, and Nascent Market Dynamics
B Versaevel
Dynamic Games and Applications 5 (4), 440-466, 2015
22015
Mieux qu’un compromis, une troisième voie: le panier de brevet pour accélérer l’accès aux vaccins et traitements contre la Covid-19
E Billette de Villemeur, V Dequiedt, B Versaevel
Revue d’Economie du Développement 21 (1-2), 17-42, 2022
2022
Optimal Collusion with Limited Liability
E Billette de Villemeur, L Flochel, B Versaevel
International Journal of Economic Theory 9 (3), 203-227, 2013
2013
On the tacit collusion equilibria of a dynamic duopoly investment game
R Ruble, B Versaevel
Economics Bulletin 32 (4), 2817-2827, 2012
2012
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Articles 1–16